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CASE COMMENTS
ExwnmNT DomAN-AnUTTING OwNEs HELD NOT EiTLnED To ENJoIN
RAILROAD TRACkS IN STrET.-By ordinance, the general council of the

city of Louisvilld granted appellee the right to construct certain railroad tracks on Fourteenth street. Appellee soon began the construction
of tracks thereon. Appellant, an abutting lot owner, sought an injunction on the ground that the tracks would destroy its ingress to,
and egress from, its lot, i. e., would constitute a taking of private property for public use without Its consent and without just compensation
having first been paid. It was proved that the tracks were constructed
In such a way that they did not of themselves in any way interfere
with the use by anyone of the street for any purpose for which it was
dedicated, when opened as a public street. The tracks were planked
over in such a way that any type of vehicle might pass over them without inconvenience or danger. Injunction refused. P. Bannon Pipe Co.
v. Illinois Central R. R. Co., 203 Ky. 659.
Authorities are divided as to whether laying tracks on a dedicated
street is a new appropriation. Since the construction and operation of
a railway on and along a public road by a company having authority
from the state to do so Is not a use contemplated at the time of the
dedication of such road, the owner of the fee thereof, and of the lands
abutting thereon, may prevent any special damage by such use and
resort to a court of equity, or he may redress the same in a court of
law. W. By. o1 Ala. v. Ala. G. T. R. Co., 96 Ala. 272. An abutting
owner, holding title to the center of a street, whose right has not been
acquired by a railroad company, is entitled to enjoin such company
building or operating its railroad line on such street. Ogden, Lansing
v. Schenectady Ry. Co., 77 N. Y. S. 889; X. Pa. B. Co. v. Inland Traction Co., 205 Pa. 570; S. and N. A. R. Co. v. Davis, 185 Ala. 193; Herzog
v. Pittsburg, C. C. and St. L. By. Co., 25 0. Cir. Ct. R. 702.
It is within the discretion of municipal authorities to permit steam
railroad tracks to be laid and operated in the public streets, and such
appropriation of the streets is not such a new use thereof, or an additional burden thereon, as will entitle an abutting property owner to
enjoin such use of the street. His remedy is at law. Corcoranv. Chicago,
M. and N. R. Co., 37 Ill. App. 417; Gorman v. C. B. and Q. R. Co., 259
Nyo. 483 State v. Sup, Ct,, Benton County, 64 Wash. 594. The owner of
land abutting on a street cannot complain of its use for railroad purposes conducive to the public good, and not interfering with his right
to its use as a highway. Montgomery v. Santa Ana and W. By. Co.,
104 Cal. 186.
The position of the Kentucky courts on the point in question is
reviewed In a leading case. The power to appropriate a part of a common highway to the purpose of a railroad, without making provision
for compensation to the owner of the fee, has been a fruitful subject
of judicial conflict. It has Ieen urged that it is an additional burden;
a new and distinct servitude upon the estate, inconsistent with the
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original dedication, and cannot, therefore, be imposed without compensation to the owner of the fee. Upon the ocher hand it is said,
that it is consistent with the dedication; that there is an identity of
uses; and that the use of a part of a street by a railway does not
exceed the limit of the easement already belonging to the public ...
If compensation has been made for the easement, the subsequent appropriation to another mode of use within the limit of the primary
purpose, or one of like kind, certainly should not require a further
compensation. . . . Whether the abutting lot owner owns the fee
in the street, subject to the public use, or does not, he, as such adjacent proprietor, has, however, a peculiar private right in the street
which attaches to his lot. He is entitled to its reasonable use for all
the ordinary modes of passage. This is an easement attaching to his
adjoining lot, an incident of his title to it, and he cannot be deprived
of it without compensation. He, however holds his property subject
to the appropriation of the street by the public to such means of
facilitating travel and commerce as will most redound to the public
good. The right under legislative authority to permit the construction
and operation of a railroad by steam along or upon a street is not now
an open question in this state, however much conflict of authority may
exist elsewhere; and this without regard to whether the fee subject
to the public use is in the adjoining owner or not. Beginning with
the case of L. and C. R. Co. v. Applegate, etc., 8 Dana. 289, followed by
the cases of Wolf v. C. and L. Z?. R. Co., 15 B. M. 409; L. and F. R. R.
Co. v. Brown, 17 B. 11. 772; Newport and CincinnatiBridge Co. v. Foote,
9 Bu. 264; Cosby v. C. and B. R2. R. Co., 10 Bu. 288; E. LI. and Big
Sandy R. R. Co. v. Combs, 10 Bu. 382; and the J. M. & I. B. R. Co. v.
Esterle, 13 Bu. 675, this doctrine has been repeatedly announced and
must now be regarded as firmly established.
The construction of a railroad along a street is not, per se, an encroachment upon the individual right of the abutting lot owner, and
whether he can complain depends not upon the fact of its existence,
but the manner of its construction and, operation. If he is thereby
deprived of its reasonable use, he may appeal to the courts for relief;
but if he is merely inconvenienced thereby, or suffers some remote consequential injury, it is damnum absque inj ria. . . . Whether any
special and substantial injury will result to the adjoining owner in this
instance is, however, as yet a mere matter of speculation; and if any,
Its character or extent can be much better estimated after the road is
in operation; and, at most, it would be a matter of mere damage, for
which the law affords an adequate remedy. Fulton v. Short Line Ry.
Transfer Co., etc., 85 Ky. 640.
L. C.
EXPLosivEs-CARE REQUIRED IN USE-INuTRIS TO TnAvExLxR ox
HIGHWAY REGARDLFSS oF NEGLIGEMc.-For the purpose of demolishing
a bridge, the defendant railroad company placed dynamite under one
end of the bridge. A large number of people, among whom was the
plaintiff's decedent, gathered to witness the explosion but defendant's
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employees stretched a rope 180 or 200 feet from the bridge and directed
all persons to stay behind it. They were then in the public street of
the city. The explosion threw a piece of steel which struck the plaintiff's decedent, killing him.. Held defendant was liable. Louisville &
Nashville 1. R. 0o. v. Smith's Acimr., 203 Ky. 513.
The law governing the use of explosives is well established. If
one In blasting, throws stones or debris on the property of another, he
Is liable in trespass whether guilty of negligence or not. Gary v. Morrison, 128 Fed. 177; Fitzsimmons v. Braun, 199 Ill. 390; Langhorne v,
Turman, 141 Ky. 809; Hay v. Cohoes Co., 2 N. Y. 159; St. Peter v. Dennison, 38 N. Y. 416; Sullivan v, Dunham, 161 N. Y. 290; Tiffin v. McCormack, 34 Ohio St. 633; Hickey v. McCabe, 30 R. I. 346. Since the
safety of person is much more sacred than the safety of property it
follows that the user of explosives should be held for a personal injury occasioned thereby to a person in a place where he might lawfully
be. Hay v. Cohoes, 2 N. Y. 159; Suli4van v. Dunham, 161 N. Y 290.
The plaintiff's decedent was in a place where he could lawfully be,
the public highway. The right of the deceased is as if he were on own
premises when the injury took place. He believed this highway was
safe and he had a right to believe so, regardless of his knowledge that
there was going to be an explosion, since the act of the defendant's employees In putting up the rope impliedly assured him that the rope circumscribed the danger zone. And in fact, -the -highway was safe except for the acts of the defendant. It might be said that the defendant
was negligent in its use of the property, since blasting was not the
only way of removing the bridge from the piers; it was more an experiment than anything else and, indeed, another method was finally resorted to.
Sullivan v. Dunham, 161 N. Y. 290, is a case directly in point. The
plaintiff was killed by a stump, the result of a blast in an adjoining
field. In this case we find, "It renders the enjoyment of all property
more secure, by preventing such a use of one piece by one ian as
may injure all his neighbors. It makes human life safer, by tending
to prevent one landowner from casting, either with or without negligence a part of his land upon the person of one who is where he has a
. It lessens the hardship by placig absolute lia
right to be .
bility upon the one who causes the injury. The accident in question
was a misfortune to the defendant but it was a greater misfortune to
the young woman who was killed. Public travel must not be endangered to accommodate the rights of private individuals."
This last decision and the decision of the case in hand are in acE. B. C.
cordance with both the law and good sense.

G-nrs-Gis INTEn Vivos-GInTs CAUsA MoTis-RvocATxoN.-Two days before his death, the decedent, in the presence of his brother
and his former wife, said to his brother, "Take care of sister's $6,000
and give Maggie Belle $3,000." The brother refused to qualify as executor, but defendant qualified as administrator with the will annexed
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and the wife, Maggie Belle, brings this action against him on the
ground that it was a gift causa mortis. Held not a valid gift. Drake v.
Security Trust Co., 203 Ky. 733.
It is clear that this gift, if valid, was made in contemplation of
imminent death and thus was a gift causar
mortis as distinguished
from a gift inter 'vivos. But it is essential to the validity of any gift
either causa mortis or inter vivos that there be either actual, constructive, or symbolical delivery during the lifetime of the donor.
Payne v. Powell, 5 Bush 248; Ashbrook v. Ryan, 2 Bush 228; Turpin v.
Thompson, 2 Met. 420; Meriwether v. Morrison, 78 Ky. 572. In the
latter case this statement is made, "So far as the act of delivery is
necessary to complete the gift, the law is the same as to gifts causa
mortis and inter vivos." Parson on Contracts, pages 234, 235, says,
"Hence a delivery, actual or constructive, is essential to the validity of
every gift. . . . Nor will a transfer by writing alone satisfy the
requirements of delivery." Neither can a gift inter vivos be revoked by
the donor. Gault v. Trumbo, 17 B. Mon. 682; St. Joseph's Orphan Society v. Wolpert, 80 Ky. 86; Meriwether v. Morrison, 78 Ky. 572.
Certainly there was.no delivery here. Nothing passed from the
donor to the donee or to any trustee for the donee. The donor simply
said, "Give Maggie $3,000." It is clear that his intention was that the
gift was to be made after his death by his brother whom he appointed
his executor, and to whom this direcion was given. According to the
established law on this point, this transaction could not have taken
effect as a gift causa mortis, and the court so held.
E. B. C.
Ho-frOmE-AccusED ENTITLED TO A RETuN OF CosruLsory PRocEss.
-The defendant was found guilty of murder in the first degree. At
the trial he filed an affidavit for a continuance on account of absent
witnesses.
The attorney for the Commonwealth demurred to the
sufficiency of the affidavit and motion for continuance. The demurrer
was overruled and the continuance was denied. On motion a special
bailiff was appointed and warrants of arrest of the witnesses mentioned were placed in his hands for execution, but he never reported
any action thereunder to the court. Held, as there had never been
a lawful return of process and in accordance with the right the accused
had to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, the
court erred in denying the appellant's motion for continuance. Fugate
v. Commonwealth, 202 Ky. 509.
At common law a person accused of crime could not demand compulsory process for his witnesses. At the present time the constitutions and statutes usually give the accused the right to compulsory
process. Under the provision of the Bill of Rights there is guaranteed
to the accused in criminal prosecutions the right to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. Hancock v. Parker, 100
Ky. 143; Comm. v. Jones, 10 Bush 746; Davis v. Comm., 77 S. W. 1101.
Such provisions however do not guarantee that there shall be more
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than ordinary diligence on the part of the officers to whom the service
of the process is instrusted. They only contemplate that the officer
shall make diligent efforts to serve the process, and it is up to the
court to see that either the process is served or can'not be served for
a good and sufficient reason. Smitfl v. State, 118 Ga. 161; State v. Huff,
161 Alo. 459. In the principal case there was never a return of process
which goes to show that the officer's efforts did not even amount to
ordinary diligence.
A. H. T.
HUSBAND AND WIFE-ANTEUPTIAL CoxTRACT PROVIDING WIFE SHAT
23E LTBLE ron NECESSAIES.-Appellant entered into a written antenuptial contract, providing that each party thereto would be liable for
his or her own necessaries, and that neither party desired any interest
in the property of the other either during their joint lives or after
death of the other. They married and lived together until the wife's
death. Decedent's administrator recovered judgment against the husband for the physicians' and nurses' bills, also the funeral and burial
expenses.
From the decision in favor of plaintiff, this appeal is brought. The
court held the antenuptial agreement was not void. Atkins v. Atkins'
Administrator, 203 Ky. 291, 262 S. W. 262.
The principal question to be decided was whether a wife could bind
herself for necessaries, and if an antenuptial contract providing wife
should be liable for her necessaries was valid.
Kentucky Statutes, section 2130 (act of 1922), reads: "The husband shall not be liable for any debts or responsibility of the wife
contracted or incurred before or after marriage, except to the amount
or the value of the property he may receive from or by her by virtue
of the marriage, but shall be liable for necessaries furnished to her
after marriage." Three are a number of cases holding that the nurses'
and physicians' bills and funeral expenses are necessaries within meanIng of the statute, and for which the husband is liable. Carpenter v.
Hazeirigg, 103 Ky. 538; Long v. Beard, 20 R. 1036, 48 S. W. 158; Brand's
Exor. v. Brand, 109 Ky. 721, 60 S. W. 704.
Section 2128 of the Kentucky Statutes provides that a married
woman may take, acquire and hold real and personal property and
sell and dispose of her personal property as if she were unmarried.
It also provides that she may make contracts and sue -and be sued as
a single woman, except with reference to the sale or mortgage of her
real estate. The statutes appear contradictory, therefore a very careful
construction is imperative. Construing the latter statute, in Hardinan's Admr. v. Crick, 131 Ky. 358, 115 S. W. 236, the court said:
'Under the express provisions of Ky. Stats., 1902, section 2128, a wife
may contract as a single woman, except that she cannot make executory contracts to sell or mortgage her real property unless her husband join. Section 2127 makes her estate liable for her debts contracted after marriage, except as otherwise provided. A wife having
the power to contract for services and personal care for herself, and
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having contracted therefor, her liability was not affected by the fact
that sdction 2130, by making the husband liable for necessaries furnished the wife after marriage, imposed upon her husband as between him and his wife the primary obligation to pay for necessaries
furnished her."
As a general rule marriage contracts are regarded with favor by
the law. In De Cicco v. Sckweizer, 221 N. Y. 431, 117 N. E. 807, the
court said that the law favors marriage settlements and seeks to uphold them, and will if necessary, strain to the uttermost the interpretation of equivocal words and conduct to hold the parties thereto.
The same view is supported in Key v. Collins, 145 Tenn. 106, 236 S. W.
3. In, Stevens v. Stevens, et al., 181 Ky. 480, 205 S. W. 573, it was held
that antenuptial contracts are perfectly legitimate and are uniformly
sustained unless there is evidence that they have been procured by
fraud. In the case of In re Malchow's Estate, 143 Minn. 53, 172 N. W.
915, the court held that antenuptial contracts are not against public
policy, but are regarded with favor, as conducive to the welfare of
the parties making them, and will be sustained wherever equitably
or fairly made. The same view is upheld in Stratton v. Wilson, 170
Ky. 61, 185 S. W. 522; Gaines v. Gaines, 163 Ky.-260, 173 S. W. 774.
Equity will always enforce a marriage contract whenever possible.
A contract of marriage settlement fairly made and expressing the
real intentions of the parties will be upheld and enforced in a court
of equity, without reference to the validity of the agreement at law.
Thus, an antenuptial contract not constituting in law a bar to dower,
may be specifically enforced in equity, so as to bar dower, but such
agreement will not be so enforced unless it is just and reasonable.
Gould v. Womack, 2 Ala. 83. In McAlpine v. McAlpine, 116 Me. 321,
101 At. 1021, the court went so far as to say that an antenuptial contract between husband and wife, not signed In presence of witnesses,
as required by statutory provisions, was, nevertheless enforceable in
equity and a bar to the wife's dower.
In Minnis v. Steele (Ind. App.), 132 N. E. 702, the court held that
a married woman can make a valid contract binding herself to pay
for personal services rendered to herself and her husband notwithstanding the husband's duty to support her, so that one rendering
those services under a joint contract with the husband and wife can
recover from the wife's administrator for services prior to the husband's death. In Lavoie v. Dube, et ux., 229 Mass. 87, 118 N. E. 179,
It was held that a wife could bind herself with her husband jointly or
severally to pay their board as if she were single.
In deciding the case in question, the court held that an antenuptial contract providing that a wife shall be liable for her necessaries was not void.
W. F. S.
MuNIcIPAL CoRPoiATIoNs-DELEGATION or POwEn TO MANAGE WATER
A&NDELEcTRIC LIGHT PLANTS.-In 1918 a municipality of the fourth
class passed an ordinance which provided that the council appoint a
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committee of five members to control and operate its water works and
light plant. This committee was given absolute and exclusive control
of the water works and electric light plant, its operation, fiscal management and regulation of rates. The committee was required to make
reports of receipts and expenditures to the city council at stated times;
it was duly appointed and installed and managed the plants with apparent success. This bill was brought to enjoin and restrain the committee from further continuing to operate said plants and to require
the city thru its council to take charge and operate said plants.
The question is, has the municipality power thru its council to
delegate to a committee the right to control, operate and manage its
water works and electric light plant?
It was held that under the Kentucky Statutes, section 3580, a city
may, thru its council, delegate to a committee the power and right to
control, operate and manage its water works and electric light plants.
City of Mayfield v. Phipps, et al., 203 Ky. 531, 263 S. W. 37.
Unless restricted by its charter or some statute a council may deleZate, to a committee, powers of purely ministerial administrative or
executive nature. Hitchcock v. Galveston, 96 U. S. 341. The point of
the case hinges on what may be considered as ministerial power.
Where a district is vested by law with power to distribute water furnished to it under an authorized agreement and to regulate its use
rand price paid therefor, the exercise of such power is mandatory and
cannot be delegated. Arnold v. Mayor of Pawtucket, 21 R. I. 15, 41
Atl. 576.
The general rule is that powers which are not imperative may be
delegated by the council to some subordinate body or officer. A city
council authorized to construct sidewalks can direct the mayor and
committee on streets to make a contract in behalf of the city for doing
the work. Hitchcock v. City of Galveston, 96 U. S. 341, 27 L. Ed. 659.
The council had power to direct the committee of finance to divide
lawyers into classes for the purpose of taxing them. Ould v. Richmond,
23 Gratt. (Va.), 464, 14 Am. Rep. 139.
A municipal corporation should be regarded as a business corporation and when not limited by methods prescribed by its charter should
be permitted to act with the same business foresight as other business
Institutions. If the council sees fit to appoint a committee to carry
out the details it may do so. City of Biddeford v. Gates, 104 Me. 506,
72 Atl. 335.
The Kentucky statute provides for appointment of a board of
public works by the council, in cities of the fourth class, and where no
board of public works has been established, the duties shall be performed by the countil and such other agents as the council may
designate. Ky. Statutes, section 3580 (1894). Further, the board of
public works shall have exclusive power to construct plants for supplying the city or its inhabitants with water, light, heat and power.
My. Statutes, section 3533.
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A city, in the management of its electric light plant, is not exercising governmental or legislative powers but mere business powers
and may conduct such plant in the manner which, in the judgment of
the city council promises greatest benefit to the city and its inhabitants.
City of Henderson v. Young, 119 Ky. 224, 83 S. W. 583. The principal
case is in line with this case; the city of Mayfield was acting in conformity with the statute and it was within the rights of the council to
B. K. M.
delegate this power to the committee.

NEGLIGEwoE-LIAI"ITTY

OF

MANUFACTURER

TO

THIRD

PEzsos.-A

husband went with his wife to the defendant's furniture store where
he bought and paid for a swing. He and his family had used it for
seven months when the hook from which it was suspended broke and
the swing fell, injuring the purchaser's wife. She sued in her own
name for damage- caused by the company's negligence in installing
the swing, which was a part of its contract. Held that she cannot recover. Osheroff v. Rhodes-Burford Co., 203 Ky. 408.
The general rule in regard to such actions by third parties is that
the manufacturer or seller is not liable to third persons who have no
contractual relations with him for negligence in the construction,
manufacture or sale, of articles manufactured or sold. Bragdon v.
Perkins-CampbellCo., 87 Fed. 109; Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach.
Co., 120 Fed. 865. To this rule, however, the courts have very generally
recognized an exception in the case of articles of sale that are "inherently" or "imminently" dangerous. As it is ordinarily stated, an
act of negligence of a manufacturer or seller which is imminently
dangerous to life or health of mankind, and which is committed in the
preparation or sale of an article intended to preserve, destroy or affect
human life, is actionable by third persons who suffer from the negligence regardless of privity of contract." This rule has been followed
by the Kentucky Court of Appeals in Heindirk v. Louisville Elevator
Co., 122 Ky. 675; Berger v. Standard Oil Co., 126 Ky. 156; Olds Motor
Works v. Shaffer, 145 Ky. 616; and Pullman Co. v. Ward, 143 Ky. 727.
The manufacturer or vendor of a tool, machine, or appliance, which
is not in its nature intrinsically dangerous, is not ordinarily liable for
defects therein to one not in privity with him. This has been held to
be the law in respect to a land roller. Kuelling v. Roderick Lean Mfg.
Co., 84 N. Y. Supp. 622; a drop press, McCaffrey v. Mossberg Mfg. Co.,
23 R. I. 381; a threshing machine cylinder. Heiser v. Kingsland Mfg.
Co., 110 Mo. 605 a balance wheel, Loop v. Leitehfiee, 42 N. Y. 351; a
steam boiler, Losee v. Clute, 51 N. Y. 474; a hoisting apparatus, Burke
v. De Castro, 11 Hun. 342; a gasoline pear burner, Talley v. Beever, 78
S. W. 23.
In the principal case the court held that a porch swing which fell,
after being used for seven months, by reason of crystallization of the
hook, could not be classed as an "inherently" or "'imminently" dangerols thing.
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It was urged that the wife being the one for whose benefit the
contract was made, was the beneficiary, and privy to the contract.
The court has previously held that persons for whose benefit the contract was made though a stranger to the consideration might sue
thereon. Tobim v. Frankcfort Water Co., 158 Ky. 352; Benge v. Hiatt's
Admr., 82 Ky. 666; and cases cited, but no Kentucky case has extended
a vendor's liability to a third party unless the thing sold was inherently dangerous or unless the vendor knew of a defect and concealed it from the purchaser as in Ols Motor Co. v. Shaffer, 145 Ky.
616. The court declared the wife could not have maintained an action
for the failure of the company to fulfill the contract, thus she certainly
could not have recovered on an action for negligent performance of
the contract.
E. B. C.

OFFiCERnS POWER TO ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT FOR 0FFE1SE COM-

IMtrTED IN HIS PiESENCE-EXTENT OF POWER TO SEAR=O ArEn LAWFUL
ARn sT-EvmENcE OF SEARcH ADmssmLE AT TRIA.-The defendant,
through exertions of throwing balls at a doll rack raised the skirt of
his coat and caused it to hang on a bottle in his hip pocket. The
bottle contained white liquid and was clearly visible to those behind
him. A deputy marshal standing a few feet back observed this and
arrested the defendant for having intoxicating liquor in his possession.
The marshal gave in evidence that the contents had the odor of moonshine whiskey. Held, the officer had sufficient authority to arrest
without warrant and the evidence of search was admissible. Judgment
affirmed in the appellate court. Elswiclk v. Comm., 202 Ky. 703.
Any peace officer has the right to arrest without warrant when he
has reasonable grounds to believe that the person arrested has committed a felony. Turner v. Comm., 191 Ky. 829; Wright v. Comm., 85
Ky. 123. By reasonable grounds it is meant that he may arrest without warrant if he is apprised by any of his senses that a crime is being committed in his presence. So an officer in making an arrest without warrant does not necessarily have to be an eye witness of every
fact or circumstance necessary to the commission of the crime. Ex
lParte Morrill, 35 Fed. 261; McBride v. U. S., 284 Fed. 416. Considering the question of search it is universally held that an officer may
search a person whom he has lawfully arrested He may search without warrant where the thing sought is open and obvious so that anyone
within reasonable distance can readily and plainly see it. Comm. v.
Warner, 198 Ky. 784; Boyce v. Comm., 194 Ky. 480.
A. H. T.

STATUTE

OF FRAUDS-CONTRACT

TO DEVISE

REALTY;

STATUTE

or

FRAUDS-PART PEROnFMA cE; M1EASURE OF REcovERY.-On behalf of the
infant F, it was alleged that, on the occasion of his widowed mother's
remarriage, the grandfather made an oral contract with the mother
that if she would permit F to live with his grandparents, he would
leave all his property to F. The will divided the proprety, real and
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personal, equally between F and the widow of the grandfather-testator. It is now sought to impress a trust upon the widow's half in
favor of F. Held oral contract was not shown. Broughton v. Broughton, 203 Ky. 1089.
A person of testamentary and contractual capacity, free from
fraud and undue influence, may make a valid and enforceable contract
of his property by will, if the contract is fair and equitable and conforms with the requirements of contract law. It is evident from the
latter stipulation, that the contract must not be within the statute of
frauds. A parol contract to make a particular testamentary disposition is not void under the statute of frauds, when no real estate Is
involved. Whiton v. Whiton, 179 Ill. 32. A contract to devise, being
contingent, may be fully performed within one year. King v. Hanna,
9 B. Alon. 369. An agreement by parol to devise land is within the
statute of frauds. Lozier v. Hill, 68 N. J. Eq. 300.
In the majority of jurisdictions, which hold that a parol contract
to devise realty is within the statute, the question is next raised as to
whether part performance will take the case out of the statute. Part
performance of a parol contract to make a will in consideration of
services by rendering such services is sufficient to take it out of the
statute of frauds, if the services are of such a peculiar character that
it is impossible to estimate their value and it is evident that the parties did not intend that their value should be so measured. Owens v.
MoNally, 113 Cal. 444. Part performance of such a character that the
court could not restore the promisee to the situation that he was when
the agreement was made or compensate him in damage, is sufficient to
take contract out of the statute of frauds. Best v. Grolapp, 69 Neb. 811;
Sharkey v. McDerinott, 91 Mo. 647; Johnson v. Hubbell, 10 N. J. Eq.
332; Quinn v. Quinn, 5 S. D. 328; Burdine v. Burdine, 98 Va. 515; Soper
v. Galloway, 129 Ia. 145.
An oral agreement to devise real estate to another in consideration of services to be performed is within the statute of frauds and
cannot be enforced, but the party performing the services is not without a remedy and may recover the reasonable value of his services.
Duke's Admr. v. Crump, 185 Ky. 323. The following excerpt from the
leading case in Kentucky upon this point is an excellent summary of
the history of the question in this state, the leading case being Waters
v. Cline, 121 Ky. 611, 85 S. W. 209. The rule in Kentucky is that part
performance of a contract will not take it out of the statute. But the
court has also uniformly held that the statute is a shield, not a sword,
and that where the party has received the consideration of the contract the court will not allow him to rely upon the statute and keep the
consideration. Roberts v. Tunnell, 3 T. B. Mon. 247; Montague v. Garnett, 3 Bu. 297; Bethel v. Booth and Co., 115 Ky. 145; Weber v. Weber,
25 K. L. R. 908.
L. P.C.
STREFT RAiLwAxs-LIAnrrr Pon FAmimr.u
TO SoUND GoaG-AuToxoLE DRvER's L A.m--Appellee's Intestate was killed in his auto-
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mobile as the result of a collision with appellant's interurban car. The
car had come to a full stop on the main street of a city, or if moving
at all was moving very slowly, when deceased traveling at the rate
of 18 to 20 miles per hour, drove head-on into the car. The headlight
of the interurban was turned on, while the lights of the automobile
were not; it was not quite dark. As to whether or not the motorman
sounded the gong of the interurban is doubtful. Plaintiff recovered
a verdict which was not sustained on appeal. Louisville & Interurban
Railway Co. v. Bedford's Admr., 203 Ky. 583.
It is the duty of a motorman to keep a lookout for vehicles on
the track and to give warning of the approach of the car, when he
discovers the presence of vehicles on the track in a place of apparent
peril, and to exercise ordinary care to prevent a collision, and a failure
to do so is negligence. Louisville Railway Oa. v. Flannery, 134 Ky.
751, 121 S. W. 663. It is also the duty of a motorman, after discoverIng a vehicle in danger, to use all reasonable effort to avoid a collision with it, but he has a right to presume that a driver, though
only a few feet from the track, will stop and not make an effort to
cross immediately in front of a rapidly approaching car. Kuchler v.
Milwaukee Electric Ry., 157 Wis. 107, 146 N. W. 1133. A street car
company owes to those having a right of common use to the streets,
only that degree of care that a person of ordinary prudence would
exercise under like circumstances. Lexington Railway Co. v. Woodward, 32 Ky. L. R. 653, 106 S. W. 853. In the present case the motorman had no reason to presume that decedent was in peril or that he
would fail to turn off the track, for another automobile had proceeded
down the street and passed the interurban just immediately ahead
of decedent; also another automobile driver just behind decedent's ma,chine stopped when the collision occurred.
When an automobile driver is approaching a street car and has
a clear view of it when he is several feet away, the law holds that a
motorman does not have to sound a warning of approach. Mayer v.
Louisville Railway Co., 192 Ky. 371, 233 S. W. 785; Gubernick v. United
Railway System of St. Louis, 217 S. W. 33.
It seems to be a general principle of law that a motorman can
assume that an automobile driver will turn out of the track, unless
he is in such close quarters as to present a perilous situation. lIn
Terra Haute I. d D. Traction Co. v. Overpeck, 77 Ind. App. 273, 131 N.
E. 543, it was decided that there is no special duty to use due care in
favor of a particular party by stopping a street car, without actual
notice of the particular party's peril In Doyle v. PhiladelphiaRapid
Transit Co., 261 Pa. 248, 104 Atl. 575, the court held that the motorman
of a street car can assume that the driver of a vehicle, in the street
ahead of him alongside of track, will not dr:Te in front of car. It
has also been held that a motorman has the right to assume that one
on the track, and apparently capable of taking care of himself, will
leave it before the car reached him, and that he may indulge the pre-
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sumption until the danger of collision is imminent. Citizens Railway
Co. v. Shepherd, 107 Tenn. 444, 64 S. W. 710.
The authorities are clear that an automobile driver is required to
keep a lookout. In Hope, et ux. v. Southern Pa. Traction Co., 270 P.
115, 112 Atl. 920, it was held that a person driving a wagon has a right
to use the road and turn upon the street car track if necessary, subject,
however, to the duty of looking for approaching cars and taking proper
precautions to avoid a collision. A more specific rule is laid down in
Mobile Light & Railway Co. v. Thomas, 16 Ala. 629, 80 Son. 693, in
which case the court decided that it is as much the duty of one driving on a street car track to keep a lookout in each direction for approaching cars when sufficiently near the track as it is the motorman's
-duty to keep a lookout.
A person is held to have had knowledge of all such dangers as may
be shown to have been obvious or patent. Gentzkow v. Portland 1 .
Co., 54 Ore. 114, 102 Pac. 614. One failing to use proper precaution to
avoid a collision is guilty of contributory negligence. In Louisville
Ry. Co. v. Bas7er, 198 Ky. 500, 248 S. W. 1027, the court held that an
automobile driver, who on a foggy night, saw a street car approaching
when he was 60 feet away from the point where he intended to cross
the tracks, and who thereafter paid no further attention to the approaching car and started across the tracks, was guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law. A driver crossing the street and struck
by a street car, which he could have seen approaching in time to have
avoided a collision, had he looked, is guilty of contributory negligence.
Herrett v. Puget Sound Traction, Light & Power Co., 103 Wash. 101,
173 Pac. 1024.
The court In deciding the present case, upheld recent Kentucky
decisions and those of other state courts on the modern law of negligence. It was held that a motorman meeting an automobile is not required to sound gong; a motorman may assume that an automobile
driver will turn out; and that a driver traveling at the rate of 15
to 20 miles per hour and colliding head-on with a street car, almost
stopped, was guilty of contributory negligence, though blinded by the
brilliancy of the iight on the car. Judgment reversed in favor of appellant.
W. F. S.

VENDOR AND PumoixASE-PuYcCHASE

HELD NOT ENTImED To RE-

covEn Fop DEFICIENCY IN AcREAGE WEN LAND is

SoLD By BouNDAY.---

L sold to S his farm, the land conveyed being described in the deed as
follows: "A certain tract of land bounded on the east by Bear creek;
on the north by Sunfish creek; on the south by the lands of Daniel
Durbin, on the west by William Farris' lands, containing about three
hundred acres, be the same more or less. But it is distinctly understood that this land is sold by the boundary and not by the acre." S
sued L charging that L had represented to him that the tract contained
300 acres, whereas, in fact, it contained only 252 acres. Held he could
not recover. Sanders v. Lindsey, 204 Ky. 57.

CASE CO.tME-NTS
The vendee's right to a remedy thru this action rests entirely on
the question as to whether the sale of the land was made with reference to the amount of property that was to pass by the deed, or whether
it was specifically intended by the parties that the tract should pass
and that the quantity of the same was referred to merely for the purposes of description.
A reading of the deed which conveyed the property in question
and a reference to the authorities of this jurisdiction concerning this
question will clearly show that the sale in question was made essentially by the tract. The deed described the land as "containing about
300 acres, be the same more or less, and then distinctly mentioned that
the land was to be sold by the boundary and not by the acre. This
provision not only delineates the intention of the parties as to the
manner in which the property was to pass but also removes vendee's
right to sue the vendor on the ground of fraudulent misrepresentation,
which in effect is the only means of attack upon the transaction open
to the purchaser.
The leading authority of Kentucky on this question is Harrison v.
Talbot, 2 Dana 266, in which it was held that "in sales by tract, in
which though a supposed quantity by estimation is mentioned or referred to in the contract, the reference was made only for the purpose of description and under such circumstances or in such manner
as to show that the parties intended to risk the contingency of quantity,
whatever it might be, or how much soever it might exceed or fall short
of that which was mentioned in the contract." This principle seems
to apply clearly and forcibly in the case at hand.
"When the quantity of land to be conveyed is given in the deed, it
will not control either monuments or courses or distances, though it
may aid a description otherwise defective. When the quantity is given
and the words "more or less" are added, no more is meant than what
the law would imply, namely, that the grantor takes the risk as to the
amount." Hopkins on Real Property, p. 425. McConn v. Deany, 3
Bibb. 46.
"Subject to the controlling consideration of the intention of the
parties as to the meaning of - the language used, the primary rule in
applying a description by boundaries is that, in case of conflict, calls
for fixed and known monuments -will prevail over calls for courses and
distances." Tiffany on Real Property, Vol. 2, Second Edition, Monuments, p. 1652; Ky. Law Jour., Vol. XII, p. 159.
li. F.

WAunANTY or TIrn nr DEED-SALE OF STANDING TREEs IN CoxTHEm INTo PEnsoNALTY.-The de-

TE1.%PLATIoN or RE.movAL CONVERTs

fendant entered into a contract by which he sold to the plaintiff an entire tract of land, one hundred and fifty acres of which were well timbered with ash, oak, and hickory. A deed was executed to the plaintiff
and contained the usual covenant of warranty of title. The plaintiff
sued for breach of warranty as the defendant had sold the timber on
the one hundred and fifty acres to a third party under a written con-
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tract The sale had been made something more than eighteen months
before the conveyance of the land to the plaintiff and by contemplation
of the parties the timber was to be severed within two years. The
plaintiff had knowledge of this before the land was conveyed to him as
he had inspected the land and seen the cutting before he agreed to
make the purchase. Judgment for defendant. Held, as the timber in
question was personalty the warranty of title in the deed did not apply.
Cheatham v. Head, 203 Ky. 489.
In Byassee v. Bees, 4 Met. 372, it was held that a sale of standing
trees in contemplation of immediate separation from the soil is a
constructive severance of them, and they pass as a chattel, and, therefore the contract -f sale is not within the statute of frauds. The follbwing kentucky, cases adhere to this rule: Tilford v. Dodson, 106 Ky.
755; Wiggins v. Jackson, 24 Ky. L. R. 2189; Strubbe v. Lewis, 25 Ky.
L. R. 605; Bowerman v. Taylor, 127 Ky. 812. In the latter case the
court said: "It has long been the rule of this court in the construction of contracts of sale of growing trees, where the parties did not
contemplate immediate severance from the soil, that such sale did not
convert the trees into personalty, but that they still formed a part
of the realty."
There is some conflict of opinion as to how the phrase "immediate
severance?' is interpreted.
In the following cases it is held that if no time is fixed for the removal of the timber, it must be done, if it is to be treated as personalty, within a reasonable time, and if the time is fixed and circumstances and conditions show it to be reasonable, then the trees become
personalty from the time of their purchase. Wiggins v. Jackson, 24 Ky.
L. R. 2189; Chestnut v. Green, 27 Ky. L. R. 838; EJvan V. Dobbs, 112
S. W. 667; Jackson v. Hardin, 27 Ky. L. R. 1110.
The court in the present case decided that two years for severance
was reasonable and the title of warranty could not apply because the
property had been converted into personalty This holding seems in
A. H. T.
accord with the earlier decisions of the court.
W.Ls-Cois TucioN-GuT To H ms ox FAmir=a or Issun.-A
will gave a life estate to the widow of testator, or until she should
marry, and then to each of two daughters of the testator an undivided moiety of the real estate for life with remainder of their respective shares to their respective issue; but in case either or both of
them should die without issue alive, then the moiety of the daughter or
daughters so dying should vest in the testator's heirs at law alive at
such time or times. The testator had no children except those mentioned in the will. They both survived him. One of the daughters
died unmarried without issue before the death of the widow. Her
husband died, then the widow died. The surviving daughter, who
never married, seeks full title to the moiety of her deceased sister
agaiiist the collateral heirs of the testator, as his only heir at law
at iher ister's death.

CASL COMMKTS
It was iontended that the words "heirs at law-at such time or
times" showed an intention to exclude either daughter from taking
the share of the other on failure of issue. Weegon, et al. v. Power,
Admr., 202 Ky. 542.
A will is construed so as to determine the intention of the testator
in order that such intention may be carried into effect as far as is
legally possible. Penick's Exor. v. Lewis, 194 Ky. 235. The intention
of a testator must be ascertained from the express words of his will, or
a necessary inference resulting from their use. Anderson v. Hall's
Admr., 80 Ky. 91, K. L. R. 579. The literal import of the words of a
will must govern where they are not controlled by other language.
Griffith v. Coleman, 28 Ky. 600. The real question then is, "What is
meant by the testator's words?" not "What did the testator intend to
say? Fowler v. Mercer's Exor., 170 Ky. 353.
Applied to this case the question becomes, "What is the literal
meaning of the words 'heirs at law?'" for where the word "heir" or
"heirs" is used it is presumed to be in the ordinary or usual sehnse,
unless the will plainly indicated otherwise. Pratherv. Watson's Boor.,
187 Ky. 709, 714. There are no words in this will which plainly indicate that when the testator used the word "heirs" he meant something entirely different. If it is conceded that the interpretation of
the word is doubtful, the surviving daughter as lawful heir will not be
excluded, for in such a situation 'the construction favorable to the
heir will be adopted. Wright v. Singleton, 190 Ky. 657; Lewis v. Reed's
Exor., 168 Ky. 559.
In Bowman v. Bowman, 49 Fed. 329, 1 0. C. A. 274, heir is defined
as "He who, after his ancestor dies intestate, has a right to all lands,
tenements and hereditaments which belonged to him or of which he
was seized." Williamson v. Williamson, 18 B. Mon. 368. At the death of
the married sister the surviving sister was the only one living who
would have been entitled to her father's realty had he died intestate
at that time. The surviving sister answers the description of heir.
The so-called collateral heirs would not inherit any .of the realty unless
both sisters were dead. Properly speaking, the collaterals are not heirs
at all under the facts given. There is a mere chance that some day
they may become heirs.
As to the words "die without issue alive," they bring the case
within the first rule laid down in Harvey v. Bell, 118 Ky. 512, 81 S. W.
671, "Where an estate is devised to one for life, with remainder to
another, and, if the remainderman die without children or issue, then
to a third person, the rule is that the words 'dying without issue'
are restricted to the death of the remainderman before the termination of the particular estate." Ky. Law Jour. Vol. XII, p. 219; Jewel
v. White, 166 Ky. 325; White v. White's Guardian, 168 Ky. 752; Weak,
ley v. Hfanna, 51 S. W. 570, 21 K. L. R. 450; Brewick v. Anderson, 267
Ill. 169. The heirs are the third parties in this case. The two daughters
are the remaindermen. One of them died without issue before the
termination of the particular estate, so that the devise over to the
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third party, the heirs, will take effect as to that one's share. The fee
never vested in the deceased daughter. Harvey v. Bell, 118 Ky. 512,
81 S. W. 671.
The words "heirs alive at such time or times" refer to the antecedent clause, "in case either or both of them should die without issue
alive," and the common meaning is heirs alive at the death of either
or both cf the daughters without issue then living, so that the case
comes within the rule in Pepper's Admr. v. Pepper's Exor., 115 Ky.
520, 74 S. W. 253, 24 K. L. R. 2403, where a testator declared that at
the death of his brothers without issue, certain land conveyed to them
should revert to his then living heirs, and it was held that the words
were used in their literal sense, and applied to all the heirs of the
testator at his death living at the death of the devisees. The surviving
daughter is the only one fulfilling this condition. Therefore she takes
the fee of her sister's moiety.
She may have the property sold to secure the moiety to which
she has absolute title, for an owner of a life estate of an undivided
part of an entire tract of land, and who also owns absolutely the other
part may maintain an action against contingent remaindermen of his
life interest for its sale or division. Ky. Civ. Code, see. 490; Korb v.
Stege, 192 Ky. 633; Orsburn v. Orsburn, 196 Ky. 176; TWheat v. Wheat,
190 Ala. 461; Watkins v. Gilmore, 130 Ga. 797; Deadman v. Yantis, 230
Ill. 243; Cummins v. Drake, 265 Ill. 111.
J. W. G.

